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Abstract
We investigate the incentive and the welfare implications of a merger when heteroge-
neous oligopolists compete both in process R&D and on the product market. We examine
how a merger a®ects the output, investment, and pro¯ts of ¯rms, whether ¯rms have
merger incentives, and, if so, whether such mergers are desirable from the viewpoint
of social welfare. We also derive equilibrium con¯gurations and explore their welfare
properties.
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1 Introduction
When ¯rms face decisions on mergers, they expect to acquire greater market shares and/or to
achieve greater e±ciencies. These e±ciency gains include operating synergies, diversi¯cation,
¯nancial synergies, and asset divestiture (Burgelman [4], Jensen and Ruback [13], Larsson
and Finkelstein [15], and Tremblay and Tremblay [23]). The prospect of economies of scale
is also an important motive for a horizontal acquisition (Capron [5]).1 Economies of scale
arise as a result of a horizontal merger if the merged ¯rm achieves unit cost savings when it
increases the scale of a given activity. They can also be achieved in functional areas including
R&D, distribution, sales, and administrative activities through the spread of ¯xed costs.
Among the elements related to economies of scale, technological innovation has often
been mentioned as one of the main reasons for M&As (de Man and Duysters [7] and Zhao
[24]). One reason for this is that M&As may raise the overall R&D budgets of the companies
involved (de Man and Duysters [7]). This allows them to reap economies of scale and enables
them to tackle larger R&D projects than each individual ¯rm could have done independently.
For instance, since the 1990s, Alcoa has sequentially taken over Alumax and Reynolds, which
were US aluminum companies, while Alcan, Pechiney, and Alusuisse carried out a three-way
merger in 2003. Those mergers might enable the companies to enlarge their capacities
and/or innovation activities. On the other hand, M&As may be executed in order to lessen
innovation expenditure if the innovative activities of merged ¯rms overlap strongly with
each other. For instance, when oil companies merge, they expect to yield savings in costs,
including transportation and plant construction costs, because they can use their installed oil
plants cooperatively and can eliminate the overlaps of their oil plants functions (Matsushima
[17]).
E±ciency gains from M&As are also achieved by merging with a ¯rm with higher pro-
duction e±ciency if a technology spillover occurs within the merged ¯rm. This can be a
strong merger incentive when ¯rms are heterogeneous in terms of their production e±ciency.
1 Capron [5] pointed out the signi¯cant risk of damaging acquisition performance when the divested assets
and redeployed resources are those of the target.
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This implies that, for a low-productivity ¯rm, merging with a high-productivity ¯rm can
be considered as an alternative to R&D. As a result, the e±ciency levels of ¯rms are de-
termined endogenously, and the achieved levels depend crucially on combinations of merged
¯rms. Therefore, it would be worth analyzing M&As in the presence of both R&D activities
related to ¯rm e±ciencies and heterogeneity of ¯rms.
Several existing studies have examined the e®ects of R&D activities on M&As (Davidson
and Ferrett [6] and Stenbacka [22]). In addition, some previous research concerning M&As
took into account the heterogeneity of ¯rms (Perry and Porter [19], Farrell and Shapiro [8],
Barros [3], and Fumagalli and Vasconcelos [9]). None of these studies, however, incorporates
both e®ects (R&D and heterogeneity) into their analytical models.
We investigate horizontal mergers in a Cournot model with ¯rm heterogeneity and R&D
investment. We ¯rst explore in detail the possible impacts of a merger on the output,
investment, and pro¯ts of ¯rms.2 We then examine whether ¯rms have merger incentives
and, if so, whether such mergers are desirable from the viewpoint of social welfare. Our
results imply that although the importance of R&D and ¯rm heterogeneity leads to merger
incentives, such mergers are desirable only when the share of e±cient ¯rms is high. In our
setting, assuming su±ciently large cost di®erences between e±cient and ine±cient ¯rms,
if R&D is not costly, a merger between homogeneous ¯rms tends to occur in equilibrium;
otherwise, a merger between heterogeneous ¯rms tends to occur. Moreover, if R&D is not
costly, it is likely that we will observe a discrepancy between the equilibrium and optimal
con¯gurations.
We brie°y review three closely related articles. Davidson and Ferrett [6] developed a
Cournot model involving a cost-reducing R&D investment. In their model, ¯rms with the
same ex ante marginal cost produce di®erentiated goods, and a merged ¯rm produces two
types of goods. Investment is good speci¯c, but investment has spillover e®ects. They
showed that investment increases the pro¯tability of mergers and also explored how the
degree of the spillover a®ects this pro¯tability. Stenbacka [22] considered the case in which
2 Note that we cannot discuss the e®ect of the spillover of the investment, as in Davidson and Ferrett [6],
because we assume that ¯rms produce a homogeneous good.
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the results of a cost-reducing investment are uncertain and the realization of the results is
private information belonging to the innovating ¯rm. Stenbacka then examined whether
merger anticipations lead to ex ante incentives for innovating ¯rms to reveal their cost-
reducing information.3 Barros [3] investigated a simple model highlighting the basic economic
intuition about the relationship between initial market concentration and the size asymmetry
of merger participants. He showed that, in more concentrated markets, mergers involve less
asymmetric ¯rms, and merger participants rank high in terms of the size distribution of
¯rms. However, he did not take into account R&D activities.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the basic model
and some results. Section 3 provides the results in the heterogeneous ¯rm case. Section 4
concludes the paper.
2 Basic setup
We ¯rst provide a basic model that involves investments and merger decisions, and explain
the basic characteristics of the e®ects of investment on mergers. Consider an industry con-
sisting of N (¸ 3) ¯rms initially. The model has three stages: ¯rst, it is determined whether
or not predetermined pairs of ¯rms merge; second, after the merger decisions, each (merged)
¯rm chooses its investment level, which subsequently determines its marginal cost; and in
the third stage, each ¯rm engages in Cournot competition, given the decisions on the merger
and the realized marginal costs.
More precisely, in the second stage, each (merged) ¯rm determines how much to invest
in cost-reducing R&D activities. Let xi denote the investment level chosen by ¯rm i. A unit
increase in investment decreases the ¯rm's marginal cost by the same margin. Thus, the
total production cost incurred by the ¯rm is given by (zi¡xi)qi, where qi denotes the output
level chosen by ¯rm i. In this speci¯cation, zi signi¯es the ex ante marginal cost (before the
investment), whereas zi ¡ xi denotes the ex post marginal cost (after the investment). The
cost of the investment is assumed to be °x2i . ° represents the degree of cost required for
3 Atallah [2] also analyzed merger pro¯tability in the case of cost-reducing R&D. In his numerical example,
however, R&D investment does not provide incentives for mergers in most of cases.
4
R&D investment.
We ¯rst consider an equilibrium without mergers. In the third stage, upon observing xi,
the ¯rms engage in standard Cournot (quantity) competition. The inverse demand function
is speci¯ed as follows:
p = 1¡Q; (1)
where Q is the total output. Each ¯rm simultaneously chooses qi so as to maximize its own
pro¯t. Here, we assume that zi is the same across ¯rms (zi = z, 0 < z < 1). In the next
section, we allow zi to di®er across ¯rms in a particular way. The pro¯t of ¯rm i is given by:
¼i = [P ¡ (z ¡ xi)] qi ¡ °x2i :
The Cournot competition leads to the following output levels:
qi =
1¡ z + (N + 1)xi ¡
PN
j=1 xj
n+ 1
; (2)
Q =
N(1¡ z) +PNj=1 xj
N + 1
:
Substituting this and (1) into the pro¯t function, we can derive the optimal investment level
chosen by ¯rm i in the second stage:
xi =
N (1¡ z)
° (N + 1)2 ¡N : (3)
This yields dxi=dN < 0 and readily proves that a merger (i.e., a reduction in the number N
of ¯rms) increases the investment level. A merger reduces the competition among ¯rms and
increases the market share of each ¯rm, which leads to stronger incentives for cost-reducing
investment. Equations (3) and (2) indicate the pro¯t of ¯rm i without the merger:
¼i =
° (1¡ z)2
h
° (N + 1)2 ¡N2
i
h
° (N + 1)2 ¡N
i2 : (4)
From this, we can see that a ¯rm supplies goods if and only if:4
° >
N2
(N + 1)2
:
4 This is also the second-order condition for the investment decision.
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When this condition does not hold, competition in investment is so intense that no ¯rm can
make positive pro¯ts.
We now examine how the existence of the investment decision a®ects the pro¯tability
and desirability of a merger. Here, in order to make the analysis as simple as possible, we
consider a pairwise merger; i.e., a merger between two ¯rms only. A pairwise merger only
reduces the number of ¯rms from n to n¡ 1, implying that the pro¯t ¼M of a merged ¯rm
becomes:
¼M =
° (1¡ z)2
h
°N2 ¡ (N ¡ 1)2
i
(°N2 ¡N + 1)2 :
In this section, we use simple gains from the merger as a criterion of a merger incentive.5
Therefore, when we consider a pairwise merger, we compare ¼M with the joint pro¯t of ¯rms
involved in the merger described in (4). If the former is larger than the latter, we consider
that this merger is pro¯table and that these two ¯rms have an incentive to merge. More
formally, a pairwise merger is pro¯table if:
¼M ¡ 2¼i > 0: (5)
We can show that whether this inequality holds depends on the (premerger) number n of
¯rms and the investment cost parameter °:
¼M ¡ 2¼i = ° (1¡ z)2
8><>:
2
h
N2 ¡ ° (N + 1)2
i
h
N ¡ ° (N + 1)2
i2 ¡ (1¡N)2 ¡ °N2(1¡N + °N2)2
9>=>; : (6)
Because 0 < z < 1, whether (5) holds true depends on the sign of the term in curly
brackets, which depends only on ° and N . The following ¯gure describes the region where
a pairwise merger is pro¯table in the ° ¡N plane.
[Figure 1 here]
5 This criterion is consistent with the equilibrium concept of the core (see Horn and Persson [11]). In fact,
when ¯rms are homogeneous, an allocation involving a merger that satis¯es this criterion is in the core under
the restriction of a pairwise merger. In the next section, where we introduce ¯rm heterogeneity, we use the
core as an equilibrium concept and provide an analysis of the equilibrium.
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The shaded areas of Figure 1-(i) represent the combinations of the investment cost parameter
° and the number of ¯rms N under which a pairwise merger is pro¯table. Note ¯rst that in
our model, a merger changes (a) the degree of competition and (b) the level of investment.
As shown by Salant et al. [21], in standard Cournot competition, only the e®ect on (a) is
relevant, and a merger is not pro¯table unless a merged ¯rm occupies more than 80% of
the market share. In contrast, once we introduce the cost-reducing investment, a pairwise
merger is more likely to be pro¯table because of the e®ect on (b). Equation (3) implies
that a pairwise merger increases the investment of each ¯rm in cost-reducing R&D. A larger
investment leads to a lower marginal cost and raises the pro¯t of each ¯rm for a given
market share. Because of this e®ect, a pairwise merger that is not pro¯table under standard
Cournot competition may become pro¯table. For example, when ° = 1, a pairwise merger is
pro¯table for N · 4, and the merged ¯rm occupies one-third (+33%) at most of the market
share.
Second, for a given °, a pairwise merger is more likely to be pro¯table for a smaller N .
This is because the fewer the number of ¯rms, the more a pairwise merger increases the
market share, which is likely to increase the additional pro¯ts of a merger.6
Finally, when investment is less costly, a pairwise merger is pro¯table for a larger N .
In fact, a pairwise merger becomes pro¯table for any number N (¸ 3) of ¯rms if the cost
parameter ° becomes su±ciently small (The proof is given in Appendix A).
Summarizing the above arguments, we have the following proposition.
Proposition 1 The cost-reducing R&D investment makes it more likely that a pairwise
merger will be pro¯table. A pairwise merger is pro¯table for any number of ¯rms if the
investment cost is su±ciently small.
We next examine the desirability of a pairwise merger. We use the social surplus W as
6 A change in the market share due to a pairwise merger is given by:
1
n¡ 1 ¡
1
n
=
1
n(n¡ 1) ;
which is larger for a smaller number of ¯rms.
7
the criterion of welfare:
W = consumer surplus (CS) + sum of ¯rms' pro¯ts =
Q2
2
+
NX
i=1
¼i: (7)
Denoting the premerger and postmerger surpluses as W and WM , respectively, a merger
is desirable if and only if WM ¡ W > 0. The shaded areas of Figure 1-(ii) describe the
combinations of ° and N under which a merger is desirable from the viewpoint of social
welfare. For a given °, a pairwise merger is less likely to be desirable for a smaller N , as
the merger e®ect on the degree of competition is larger. Moreover, when investment is less
costly, a pairwise merger is desirable for any number N (¸ 3) of ¯rms if the cost parameter
° is su±ciently small (The proof is given in Appendix B):
Proposition 2 The cost-reducing R&D investment makes it more likely that a pairwise
merger will be desirable. A pairwise merger is desirable for any number of ¯rms if the
investment cost is su±ciently small.
Figure 1-(iii) shows the areas in which pro¯tability and desirability do not go together.
A pairwise merger is pro¯table but undesirable when investment is costly and the number of
¯rms is small (° > 1:5 and N is close to 3). In this case, the e®ect of reducing competition
among ¯rms is large enough for a merger to be pro¯table, but the merger e®ect of enhancing
investment is small, leading to decreases in the consumer surplus. The latter e®ect dominates
the former, and the social surplus decreases. A pairwise merger is unpro¯table but desirable
when the number of ¯rms is large and the cost of investment is not small (the upper-right
area of Figure 1-(iii)). With a large number of ¯rms, the e®ect of a merger on the degree
of competition is small, and it scarcely reduces the consumer surplus. Hence, because of
increases in the investment, the consumer surplus increases. In contrast, a small impact on
the degree of competition leads to an unpro¯table merger. The former e®ect dominates the
latter, and a merger increases the social surplus.
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3 Heterogeneous ¯rms
Now, we introduce the heterogeneity of ¯rms: we allow z to di®er across ¯rms in the most
simple way. Firms are either e±cient and equipped with a low ex ante marginal cost zl or
ine±cient and equipped with a high ex ante marginal cost zh, where zl < zh.
We assume that if a pair of ¯rms merge, the value of zi becomes the minimum value
between them. In this setting, a merger between heterogeneous ¯rms is similar to the elim-
ination of the less e±cient of the merging ¯rms. Therefore, the incentive for a merger can
possibly come from two sources: one is the e±ciency gain that arises in the case of merger
between heterogeneous ¯rms, and the other is the gain from investment that is explained in
the previous section.
Suppose that zl = c and zh = c+±, where c and ± are positive constants. ± represents the
di®erence between e±cient and ine±cient ¯rms. We can apply the same calculation method
to derive the equilibrium outcomes in the two cases. The ex ante marginal cost of a ¯rm can
be represented by c+ ci, where ci (i = 1; 2; : : : ; ; N) takes value of either 0 or ±.
When there are N ¯rms, the pro¯t functions of the ¯rms are denoted by:
¼(N; c; ci) = [1¡Q¡ (c+ ci ¡ xi)] qi ¡ °x2i ;
where c ´ (c1; c2; : : : ; cN ). Given the values of x, the ¯rst-order conditions lead to:
q(N; c; ci) =
1¡ c¡N(ci ¡ xi) +
P
j 6=i(cj ¡ xj)
N + 1
: (8)
Substituting q into the pro¯t functions, we derive the optimal investment levels x:
x(N; c; ci) =
N
n
[°(N + 1)¡N ] (1¡ c)¡N [°(N + 1)¡ 1] ci + °(N + 1)
P
j 6=i cj
o
[°(N + 1)2 ¡N ] [°(N + 1)¡N ] : (9)
>From the optimal investment levels, we have the equilibrium quantities supplied by the
¯rms:
q(N; c; ci) =
°(N + 1)
n
[°(N + 1)¡N ] (1¡ c)¡N [°(N + 1)¡ 1] ci + °(N + 1)
P
j 6=i cj
o
[°(N + 1)2 ¡N ] [°(N + 1)¡N ] :
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The pro¯ts and the consumer surplus are given by:
¼(N; c; ci) =
°
£
°(N + 1)2 ¡N2¤
[°(N + 1)2 ¡N ]2 [°(N + 1)¡N ]2
£
0@[°(N + 1)¡N ] (1¡ c)¡N [°(N + 1)¡ 1] ci + °(N + 1)X
j 6=i
cj
1A2 ;
CS =
°2(N + 1)2 [N(1¡ c)¡Pi ci]2
2 [°(N + 1)2 ¡N ]2 :
n e±cient and m ine±cient ¯rms exist We consider the case in which n e±cient and
m ine±cient ¯rms exist (the number of ¯rms is N = n +m). Using (8) and (9), we know
that an e±cient ¯rm invests and produces more than an ine±cient ¯rm:7
x(n;m; c; 0)¡ x(n;m; c; ±) = ±N
°(N + 1)¡N > 0; (10)
q(n;m; c; 0)¡ q(n;m; c; ±) = °±(N + 1)
°(N + 1)¡N > 0:
Moreover, the pro¯t functions and the consumer surplus are given by:
¼(n;m; c; 0) =
°
£
°(N + 1)2 ¡N2¤ f[°(N + 1)¡N ] (1¡ c) + °±(N + 1)(N ¡ n)g2
[°(N + 1)2 ¡N ]2 [°(N + 1)¡N ]2 ;
¼(n;m; c; ±) =
°
£
°(N + 1)2 ¡N2¤ f[°(N + 1)¡N ] (1¡ c)¡ ± [°(N +m¡ 1)(N + 1)¡N ]g2
[°(N + 1)2 ¡N ]2 [°(N + 1)¡N ]2 ;
CS =
°2(N + 1)2 [N(1¡ c)¡ ±(N ¡ n)]2
2 [°(N + 1)2 ¡N ]2 :
In this case, ± must satisfy the following inequality because each ¯rm's quantity supplied
must be positive.
0 < ± <
(1¡ c)((N + 1)° ¡N)
(n+ 1)(N + 1)° ¡N ´
¹±: (11)
This determines the relevant interval of °:
° >
N
N + 1
:
7 The following inequalities hold true because we assume that ° > 1.
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3.1 Merger e®ects
In this subsection, we analyze the e®ects of a merger on each ¯rm's levels of investment,
output, and pro¯t. In our current framework, a pairwise merger takes one of the following
three forms.
Type (I) A merger of e±cient ¯rms.
Type (II) A merger of heterogeneous ¯rms.
Type (III) A merger of ine±cient ¯rms.
Because we assumed that the marginal cost of a merged ¯rm is equal to the lesser marginal
cost of the ¯rms that compose the merger, a Type (I) merger is represented by a reduction
in the number n of e±cient ¯rms, and a merger of Types (II) and (III) is described by a
decline in the number m = N ¡ n of ine±cient ¯rms.
We ¯rst see how mergers of di®erent types of ¯rms a®ect ¯rms. From Section 2, we know
that a merger increases the investment level if ¯rms are symmetric. In the following three
cases, the relation between the investment level and a merger is satis¯ed:
@x(n;m; c; 0)
@n
< 0;
@x(n;m; c; ±)
@n
< 0;
@x(n;m; c; ±)
@m
< 0:
However, this relation does not always hold:
@x(n;m; c; 0)
@m
> 0 i® ¹± > ± >
(1¡ c)(N2 ¡ 1)((N + 1)° ¡N)2
(N + 1)3((n+ 2)N ¡ n)¡N2(N + 1)2(n+ 2)° +N2(N2 + n) ;
(12)
@x(n;m; c; 0)
@m
< 0 otherwise:
When the cost di®erence between e±cient and ine±cient ¯rms is large (± is large), a merger
including an ine±cient ¯rm decreases the investment levels of the e±cient ¯rms.
We now mention the mechanism behind the inequalities (Ishida et al. [12]). When a
¯rm enlarges its e®ort to reduce its marginal cost, two e®ects exist: (1) direct gain and (2)
strategic gain. The direct gain stems from the quantity supplied by the ¯rm. In other words,
the signi¯cance of the cost saving is correlated to the quantity supplied. The strategic gain
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stems from decreases in the quantities supplied by the ¯rm's rivals (because of an increase in
their market price). This is because the improvement of a ¯rm's e±ciency reduces the rivals'
quantities supplied because of strategic substitutability. The two gains depend on the number
of competitors. In general, the direct gain decreases with the number of competitors (see
Section 2). However, the negative e®ect of the increase in competitors is small when those
competitors are ine±cient. The strategic gain may increase with the number of competitors
because a unit decrease in a ¯rm's marginal cost can a®ect more ¯rms when the number of
competitors is large. Because the quantity supplied by each e±cient ¯rm is large, the strategic
gain (the price increase) has a signi¯cant impact on the incentive to invest. Therefore, if
an additional competitor is less e±cient, an increase in ine±cient competitors enhances the
R&D incentives of the e±cient ¯rms.
We now check how di®erent the impact of a merger on the strategic variables is for
di®erent types of mergers:8
¡
µ
@x(n;m; c; 0)
@n
¡ @x(n;m; c; 0)
@m
¶
> 0; (13)
¡
µ
@x(n;m; c; ±)
@n
¡ @x(n;m; c; ±)
@m
¶
> 0:
A Type (I) merger has a larger impact on ¯rms' investments than a merger of Type (II) or
(III). An e±cient ¯rm occupies a larger market share than an ine±cient ¯rm, which implies
that a Type (I) merger, which reduces the number of e±cient ¯rms, weakens the competition
among ¯rms and increases the incentive for investment more than do mergers of other types.
A similar analysis is possible regarding the output of each ¯rm:
¡
µ
@q(n;m; c; 0)
@n
¡ @q(n;m; c; 0)
@m
¶
> 0; (14)
¡
µ
@q(n;m; c; ±)
@n
¡ @q(n;m; c; ±)
@m
¶
> 0:
A Type (I) merger increases the output of each ¯rm by more than does a merger of other
types. This result arises from two e®ects: ¯rst, a Type (I) merger weakens the competition
among ¯rms more do other types of merger; second, it increases the cost-reducing investment
8 All of the explicit derivations are given in Appendix C.
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by more than do other types of mergers. As shown in Appendix C, a larger value of ° makes
these tendencies weaker, implying that the lower cost of investment strengthens the impacts
of a Type (I) merger relative to those of a merger of Type (II) or (III).
Next, we examine how a particular type of merger di®erently a®ects di®erent ¯rms:
¡ @
@n
(x(n;m; c; 0)¡ x(n;m; c; ±)) < 0;
¡ @
@m
(x(n;m; c; 0)¡ x(n;m; c; ±)) < 0;
¡ @
@n
(q(n;m; c; 0)¡ q(n;m; c; ±)) < 0;
¡ @
@m
(q(n;m; c; 0)¡ q(n;m; c; ±)) < 0:
Any type of merger a®ects ine±cient ¯rms more than it a®ects e±cient ¯rms. This result
comes from the assumption of the quadratic cost function. As seen in (10), the level of
investment is larger for an e±cient ¯rm than for an ine±cient ¯rm. When the cost function is
quadratic, even a small change in the investment level leads to large changes in the investment
cost for an e±cient ¯rm, which makes an e±cient ¯rm less sensitive to a particular change.
Appendix C shows that such di®erences between e±cient and ine±cient ¯rms in terms of
their reactions to a particular merger become larger as the investment becomes less costly
(as the value of ° becomes smaller).
Summarizing the above arguments, we obtain the following proposition.
Proposition 3 (a) A merger between e±cient ¯rms (a Type (I) merger) has larger impacts
on the levels of investment and output than does a merger involving an ine±cient ¯rm
(a merger of Type (II) or (III)). (b) A reduction in the number of ¯rms of a particular
type has larger impacts on an ine±cient ¯rm than on an e±cient ¯rm. (c) These
tendencies become more prominent as the cost of investment declines.
Although we have uncovered the e®ects of a merger on investment and output, it is
very di±cult to know whether a merger is pro¯table and desirable for arbitrary values of ±
(¯rm di®erence) and ° (investment cost) with n e±cient and m ine±cient ¯rms. In order
to obtain clear-cut results, we need to specify either a pair of ± and ° or a pair of n and m.
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The following propositions shows the pro¯tability and desirability of a merger at the limits
of ± and °, which are comparable to the results shown in Propositions 1 and 2 (the proof is
given in Appendix D).
Proposition 4 Suppose that ¯rm di®erences are su±ciently large and that the investment
cost is su±ciently small. A Type (I) or Type (II) merger is almost always pro¯table.
A Type (III) merger is always pro¯table. A merger of any type is desirable if the ratio
of e±cient ¯rms is su±ciently high.
As shown in Appendix D, a Type (I) or Type (II) merger is pro¯table when the ratio of
e±cient ¯rms is higher than some threshold values (TpI and TpII), which are given as follows.
A Type (I) merger:
n
N
> TpI ´
p
N [N2(N + 2)¡ 1]=2
N2(N ¡ 1) + 1 :
A Type (II) merger:
n
N
> TpII ´
p
N [N2(N + 2)¡ 1]
N2(N ¡ 1) + 1 :
We can readily check that TpI and TpII decline as the number N of total ¯rms increases.
When N = 3, TpI + 0:14 and TpII + 0:2. Hence, in this case, any type of merger is
pro¯table if at least one ¯rm is e±cient. These threshold values decline to TpI + 0:04 and
TpII + 0:05 (TpI + 0:0085 and TpII + 0:012) when N = 5 (N = 10). Therefore, we can safely
say that, even if ¯rms are heterogeneous, a pairwise merger is very likely to be pro¯table
if the di®erence between ¯rms is large and the investment cost is small even if ¯rms are
heterogeneous.
In contrast, we obtain very di®erent results in terms of the desirability of a merger when
comparing the case with heterogeneous ¯rms and the case with homogeneous ¯rms. From
Appendix D, the threshold value for desirability for any merger (Td) is given as:
n
N
> Td ´ 2[N
2(N ¡ 1) + 1]2
N(2N5 ¡ 4N3 +N ¡ 1) :
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We can see that Td is increasing in N . When N = 3, Td + 0:63, implying that a merger is
desirable if there is more than one e±cient ¯rm although it is undesirable if there is only
one e±cient ¯rm. Td increases to 0:70 and 0:82 when N becomes 5 and 10, respectively. As
shown in Proposition 3-(b), a particular type of merger has larger impacts on the output of
an ine±cient ¯rm than on that of an e±cient ¯rm. This implies that the lower the share
of e±cient ¯rms is, the more a merger reduces the total output. This e®ect dominates the
investment-enhancing e®ect of a merger when the share of e±cient ¯rms is lower than a
certain threshold level, leading to welfare loss.
In the next subsection, we specify the number of ¯rms as three and examine fully which
type of merger is likely to occur under particular values of ± and °. In the case of three
¯rms, we can go beyond the arguments on pro¯tability to arguments on the equilibrium.
3.2 Equilibrium and its e±ciency|the case of three ¯rms
Here, we demonstrate how the e®ects uncovered in the previous section interact to yield
equilibrium con¯gurations by using three ¯rm cases. We follow Horn and Persson [11] and
use the core as an equilibrium concept. In so doing, we consider only a pairwise merger and
assume that each merger consists of two ¯rms. This assumption has been used frequently in
previous studies and is appropriate in analyzing merger decisions, especially in the three-¯rm
model, because monopoly is prohibited in most countries.9 The ownership structure of the
industry is assumed to be formed through a cooperative game of coalition formation. With
three ¯rms, it is interesting to consider the following two cases: (i) one e±cient and two
ine±cient ¯rms exist, and (ii) two e±cient and one ine±cient ¯rms exist. In these cases, we
have four possible market structures.
Type (0) No merger.
Type (I) A merger of e±cient ¯rms.
Type (II) A merger of heterogeneous ¯rms.
9 See Davidson and Ferrett [6], Lommerud et al. [16], and Qiu and Zhou [20] for recent examples.
15
Type (III) A merger of ine±cient ¯rms.
In case (i), there are one e±cient ¯rm (labeled A) and two ine±cient ¯rms (labeled E and
F ). Therefore, we have the following three possible market structures and four ownership
structures.
Type (0) No merger: M (i)0 = fA;E; Fg.
Type (II) A merger of heterogeneous ¯rms: M (i)2 = fAE;Fg, M (i)02 = fAF;Eg.
Type (III) A merger of ine±cient ¯rms: M (i)3 = fA;EFg.
In case (ii), there are two e±cient ¯rms (labeled A and B) and one ine±cient ¯rms
(labeled E), and the following three possible market structures and four ownership structures
are relevant.
Type (0) No merger: M (ii)0 = fA;B;Eg.
Type (I) A merger of e±cient ¯rms: M (ii)1 = fAB;Eg.
Type (II) A merger of heterogeneous ¯rms: M (ii)2 = fAE;Bg, M (ii)02 = fA;BEg.
The solution procedure is based on Horn and Persson [11]. They treat the merger process
as a cooperative game of coalition formation, where the players are free to communicate and
to write binding contracts. When owners of ¯rms agree on a merger, they can decide on
any division of the ¯rm's pro¯ts. However, payments between coalitions are not allowed.
The approach then involves a comparison of any two possible ownership structures Mi and
Mj . Mi is said to \dominate" Mj if the combined pro¯ts of the \decisive" group of owners
are larger in Mi than in Mj . The decisive group of owners consists of the owners that are
expected to be able to in°uence whether Mi will be formed instead of Mj and vice versa.
In our model, although owners belonging to identical coalitions in Mi and Mj cannot a®ect
whether Mj will be formed instead of Mi, all remaining owners can in°uence this choice and
thus they are decisive.10 For instance, when we compare Type (0) (no merger, M (i)0 ) and
10 See Horn and Persson [11] for a detailed discussion on these points.
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Type (III) (a merger of ine±cient ¯rms, M (i)3 ) in case (i), ¯rm A does not merge in both
ownership structures, and ¯rms E and F merge in M (i)3 and do not merge in M
(i)
0 . In this
case, E and F are the decisive owners, whereas A is not, implying that M (i)3 dominates M
(i)
0
if the pro¯t of the merged ¯rm in M (i)3 is larger than the sum of pro¯ts of ¯rms E and F in
M
(i)
0 . The ownership structure is in the core if the structure is undominated by any other
structures. We use the core as the equilibrium concept in the following analysis.
One e±cient and two ine±cient ¯rms exist There are two types of pairwise mergers:
Type (II), a merger between heterogeneous ¯rms; and Type (III), a merger between ine±cient
¯rms. Figure 2 illustrates the combinations of the cost parameter (°) and the degree of ¯rm
di®erence (±=(1¡ c)) that lead to equilibrium.
[Figure 2 here]
Note ¯rst that, because both types of mergers imply a decrease in the number of ine±cient
¯rms, neither of the ownership structures in the two types of mergers dominates the other.
Hence, a particular ownership is in the core if it is undominated by the ownership structure
in the no-merger case. A Type (II) merger takes place in equilibrium for a broad area,
whereas we observe a Type (III) merger when the investment cost is not large, which comes
from Proposition 3 (c). When ¯rms are less di®erent and R&D investments are very costly,
the no-merger case is in the core because of the \merger paradox" (Salant et al. [21]). When
¯rms are very di®erent and R&D investments are not costly (see the upper left area in Figure
2), a merger between ine±cient and e±cient ¯rms diminishes the merged ¯rm's incentive to
invest (see (12)), and then this merger is not pro¯table. On the other hand, it is likely that
two ine±cient ¯rms will merge because the merger mitigates the e±cient ¯rm's incentive to
invest (see (12)).
We now discuss how those pairwise mergers change social welfare. The two types of
pairwise mergers lead to the same duopoly market with one e±cient and one ine±cient ¯rm.
From the results in the previous subsections, we have the conditions under which those
pairwise mergers enhance/harm social welfare.
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[Figure 3 here]
We now mention the mechanism behind the e®ects of mergers depicted in Figure 3. When
the cost di®erence is moderate, a merger is desirable because the elimination of an ine±cient
¯rm improves the production e±ciency in this market (Lahiri and Ono [14]). When the cost
di®erence is large enough and R&D investments are not costly, a merger is not desirable.
The existence of ine±cient ¯rms induces the e±cient ¯rm to engage in more R&D (see (12)),
which then accelerates the scale economies of R&D investments engaged in by the e±cient
¯rm.
Two e±cient ¯rms and one ine±cient ¯rm exist There are two types of pairwise
mergers: Type (I), a merger between e±cient Firms; and Type (II), a merger between
heterogeneous ¯rms. The following two ¯gures describe the equilibrium and its welfare
properties.
[Figure 4 here]
[Figure 5 here]
In this case, again, a Type (II) merger takes place in equilibrium over a broad area of
the Figure. In contrast, a Type (I) merger occurs only when the degree of ¯rm di®erence is
su±ciently large and the investment cost is su±ciently small. A Type (I) merger leads to a
duopoly of e±cient and ine±cient ¯rms, whereas a Type (II) merger results in a duopoly of
two e±cient ¯rms. Proposition 3 (a) implies that the former has larger impacts on the price
than the latter. This e®ect is ampli¯ed as ° gets smaller (Proposition 3 (c)). Moreover, a
large ¯rm di®erence indicates that the merged ¯rm in a Type (I) merger is more likely to
have a higher market share, implying that this type of merger is more likely to be pro¯table.
Meanwhile, from Proposition 3 (b), an outside ¯rm (an ine±cient ¯rm) in a Type (I) merger
gains more than the merged ¯rm and this ownership structure is in equilibrium.
We now mention the mechanism behind the e®ects of mergers depicted in Figure 5. The
mechanism behind a Type (II) merger is similar to the previous case in which only one
e±cient ¯rm exists. When the cost di®erence is small and R&D investments are not costly,
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a Type (I) merger is desirable even though it does not take place. The desirability of the
merger stems from the scale economies of R&D investments, but it does not take place
because of the \merger paradox" (Davidson and Ferrett [6] and Salant et al. [21]). When
the cost di®erence is large and R&D investments are not costly, a Type (I) merger is not
desirable even though it takes place. The desirability of the merger stems from the increase
in the degree of market concentration, but again the merger does not take place for the
reasons discussed in the previous paragraph. Because the ine±cient ¯rm is highly ine±cient,
a Type (I) merger gives a strong market power to the merged ¯rm.
3.3 Discussions on ¯rm heterogeneity
In this subsection, we consider the case in which three ¯rms are all di®erent: ¯rms A and
C, respectively, are e±cient and ine±cient, and their ex ante marginal costs are c and c+ ±,
respectively. Firm B is the second most e±cient ¯rm, and its ex ante marginal cost is c+®±,
where 0 · ® · 1.
[Figure 6 here]
Figure 6 shows that the desirability of a merger is nonmonotonic with respect to ® when
R&D investments are not costly (° = 1). That is, given the e±ciencies of the most and
the least e±cient ¯rms, the second most e±cient ¯rm with an intermediate value of ® does
not enhance social welfare. This is because it crowds out the incentive of the most e±cient
¯rm to invest. If it is less e±cient (the value of ® is higher), it enhances the incentive of
the most e±cient ¯rm to invest. Therefore, if R&D investments are not costly (° is small),
ine±cient ¯rms can be more bene¯cial than ones with intermediate e±ciency levels. When
R&D investments are costly (° = 4), the standard intuition mentioned by Lahiri and Ono
[14] holds. As the e±ciency of a ¯rm becomes worse, the existence of the ¯rm tends to be
harmful from the viewpoint of social welfare.
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4 Conclusion
We investigated the incentive and the welfare implications of a merger when heterogeneous
oligopolists compete both in process R&D and on the product market. We showed that
although ¯rms have merger incentives in the presence of R&D, such mergers improve social
welfare only when the share of e±cient ¯rms is su±ciently high. Under a su±cient degree of
¯rm heterogeneity, a low R&D cost leads to a merger between homogeneous ¯rms in equilib-
rium, whereas a high R&D cost implies a merger between heterogeneous ¯rms. Moreover, if
R&D is not costly, we observe a discrepancy between the incentives for, and the desirability
of, mergers.
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Appendix A: Pro¯tability of a pairwise merger for a su±ciently small °.
>From (6), ¼M ¡ 2¼i is positive if and only if:
¢ = 2
h
N2 ¡ (N + 1)2 °
i ¡
1¡N +N2°¢2 + hN2° ¡ (1¡N)2i hN ¡ (N + 1)2 °i2 > 0:
For a given number N (¸ 3) of ¯rms, ¯rms supply goods as long as ° > N2= (N + 1)2.
Therefore, the lower bound of the relevant interval of ° is N2= (N + 1)2. Evaluating ¢ at
this lower bound, we have:
lim
°!N2=(N+1)2+0
¢ =
(N ¡ 1)2N2(2N2 ¡ 1)
(N + 1)2
> 0 for N ¸ 3:
Appendix B: Desirability of a pairwise merger for a su±ciently small °.
From (7), we have:
WM ¡W =
(N ¡ 1) £4N ¡ 2 +N2(° ¡ 2) +N3°¤
(1¡N +N2°)2 +
2N3 ¡N(N + 2)(N + 1)2°
[N ¡ (N + 1)2°]2 :
This is positive if and only if:
¡ = (N ¡ 1) £4N ¡ 2 +N2(° ¡ 2) +N3°¤ £N ¡ (N + 1)2°¤2
+ [2N3 ¡N(N + 2)(N + 1)2°] ¡1¡N +N2°¢2
> 0:
Evaluating ¡ at this lower bound, we have:
lim
°!N2=(N+1)2+0
¡ =
2N2
(N + 1)4
+
N3
©
N (2N ¡ 3) £3 + 2N2 ¡N2 ¡ 2¢¤¡ 2ª
(N + 1)4
> 0 for N ¸ 3:
Appendix C: Derivations of the e®ects of mergers.
From (8) and (9), we obtain:
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¡
µ
@x(n;m; c; 0)
@n
¡ @x(n;m; c; 0)
@(N ¡ n)
¶
= ¡
µ
@x(n;m; c; ±)
@n
¡ @x(n;m; c; ±)
@(N ¡ n)
¶
=
°±N(N + 1)
[°(N + 1)¡N ] [°(N + 1)2 ¡N ] > 0;
¡
µ
@q(n;m; c; 0)
@n
¡ @q(n;m; c; 0)
@(N ¡ n)
¶
= ¡
µ
@q(n;m; c; ±)
@n
¡ @q(n;m; c; ±)
@(N ¡ n)
¶
=
°2±(N + 1)2
[°(N + 1)¡N ] [°(N + 1)2 ¡N ] > 0:
A larger value of ° makes these tendencies weak because:
@
@°
µ
°±N(N + 1)
[°(N + 1)¡N ] [°(N + 1)2 ¡N ]
¶
=
±N(N + 1)
£
N2 ¡ °2(N + 1)3¤
[°(N + 1)¡N ]2 [°(N + 1)2 ¡N ]2 < 0;
@
@°
µ
°2±(N + 1)2
[°(N + 1)¡N ] [°(N + 1)2 ¡N ]
¶
=
°±N(N + 1)2 [2N ¡ °(N + 1)(N + 2)]
[°(N + 1)¡N ]2 [°(N + 1)2 ¡N ]2 < 0:
Moreover, di®erences between e±cient and ine±cient ¯rms in their reactions to a particular
type of merger are given by:
¡ @
@n
(x(n;m; c; 0)¡ x(n;m; c; ±)) = ¡ @
@(N ¡ n) (x(n;m; c; 0)¡ x(n;m; c; ±))
= ¡ @
@n
(q(n;m; c; 0)¡ q(n;m; c; ±))
= ¡ @
@(N ¡ n) (q(n;m; c; 0)¡ q(n;m; c; ±))
= ¡ °±
[°(N + 1)¡N ]2 < 0:
These di®erences are smaller for a larger value of ° because:
@
@°
µ
¡ °±
[°(N + 1)¡N ]2
¶
=
± [°(1 +N) +N ]
[°(N + 1)¡N ]3 > 0:
Appendix D: Pro¯tability and desirability in the limits of ± and °.
A pairwise merger is pro¯table if (5) holds true. For each type of merger, this condition
becomes as follows.
A Type (I) pairwise merger (i.e., a merger of e±cient ¯rms) is pro¯table if ¼(n¡1;m; c; 0)¡
2¼(n;m; c; 0) > 0.
22
A Type (II) pairwise merger (i.e., a merger of heterogeneous ¯rms) is pro¯table if ¼(n;m¡
1; c; 0)¡ ¼(n;m; c; 0)¡ ¼(n;m; c; ±) > 0.
A Type (III) pairwise merger (i.e., a merger of ine±cient ¯rms) is pro¯table if ¼(n;m ¡
1; c; 0)¡ 2¼(n;m; c; ±) > 0.
The upper bound of the relevant interval of ± is ±, given in (11), and the lower bound of
the relevant interval of ° is N= (N + 1). Evaluating gains from a merger at these bounds,
we obtain:
lim
°!N=(N+1)+0
lim
±!±+0
¼(n¡ 1;m; c; 0)¡ 2¼(n;m; c; 0)
=
(1¡ z)2fn2N [N2(N + 2)¡ 1]¡ 2[N2(N ¡ 1) + 1]2g
n2(N + 1)[N2(N ¡ 1) + 1]2 ;
lim
°!N=(N+1)+0
lim
±!±+0
¼(n;m¡ 1; c; 0)¡ ¼(n;m; c; 0)¡ ¼(n;m; c; ±)
=
(1¡ z)2fn2N [N2(N + 2)¡ 1]¡ [N2(N ¡ 1) + 1]2g
n2(N + 1)[N2(N ¡ 1) + 1]2 ;
lim
°!N=(N+1)+0
lim
±!±+0
¼(n;m¡ 1; c; 0)¡ 2¼(n;m; c; ±)
=
(1¡ z)2N(N2 +N ¡ 1)
[N2(N ¡ 1) + 1]2 > 0:
We thus see that when ± is su±ciently large and ° is su±ciently small, a pairwise merger of
Type (I) is pro¯table if:
n
N
>
p
N [N2(N + 2)¡ 1]=2
N2(N ¡ 1) + 1 :
Similarly, a pairwise merger of Type (II) is pro¯table if:
n
N
>
p
N [N2(N + 2)¡ 1]
N2(N ¡ 1) + 1 :
The desirability of a merger comes from the following results:
lim
°!N=(N+1)+0
lim
±!±+0
·
¡@W
@n
¸
= lim
°!N=(N+1)+0
lim
±!±+0
·
¡@W
@m
¸
=
(1¡ z)2fn(2N5 ¡ 4N3 +N ¡ 1)¡ 2[N2(N ¡ 1) + 1]2g
2n(N + 1)[N2(N ¡ 1) + 1]2 > 0:
This implies that a merger is desirable if:
n
N
>
2[N2(N ¡ 1) + 1]2
N(2N5 ¡ 4N3 +N ¡ 1) :
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Figure 1: Pro¯tability and desirability of a pairwise merger with investment.
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Figure 2: Equilibrium: one e±cient and two ine±cient ¯rms.
Note: Type (0)=No merger, Type (II)=A merger of heterogeneous ¯rms,
Type (III)=A merger of ine±cient ¯rms.
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Figure 3: Social welfare and the desirability of mergers: one e±ceint and two
ine±cient ¯rms.
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Figure 4: Equilibrium: two e±cient and one ine±cient ¯rms.
Note: Type (0)=No merger, Type (I)=A merger of e±cient ¯rms,
Type (II)=A merger of heterogeneous ¯rms.
29
no inefficientfirm supplies
An undesirablemerger occurs
A desirable merger does not occur
An undesirablemerger does not occur
1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
Γ
∆
H
1-
cL
Type (I) merger
no inefficientfirm supplies
A desirable merger occurs
A desirable merger does not occur
An undesirablemerger occurs
An undesirablemerger does not occur
1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
Γ
∆
H
1-
cL
Type (II) merger
Figure 5: Social welfare and the desirability of mergers: two e±ceint and one
ine±cient ¯rms.
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Figure 6: The desirability of mergers: three di®erent ¯rms.
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